Actual encryped messages and notices are now printed directly from do_sed() / do_reply_sed().
Inline CTCP replacement is only done if the message cannot be decrypted (for the [ENCRYPTED MESSAGE]
placeholder).
This removes the need for the global flag 'sed' to alter the NOTICE and PRIVMSG handling.
A side-effect of this is that SED PRIVMSGs now do not go through the usual PRIVMSG ignore
and flood handling. This is acceptable because messages can only go through this path if
the sender has actually been added as a SED peer with /ENCRYPT, and it still goes through
the CTCP ignore and flood handling.
This test is done quite a bit across the tree, and the open-coded variants make it easy to have an
accidental mismatch between the length of the prefix being tested and the length actually passed to
strncmp().
This fixes an issue of that type comparing the server version against the prefix "u2.10", where the old
code used an incorrect length of 4.
This switches from somewhat gory string parsing based on strncmp() and next_arg() to a simpler alternative
based on sscanf(). I think these are much easier to understand now, and shouldn't have any subtle bugs
lurking like the old code.
This also removes support for some obsolete messages that don't seem to be in any modern ircds:
"Identd reponse differs"; bot messages like "Rejecting vlad/joh/com bot:" except for "is a possible spambot"
which is still in use; and the "High-traffic mode" messages.
Previously, SWATCH NONE meant "show no server notices" if OperView was
enabled, but "show all server notices" if OperView was disabled. Now,
it always means "show no server notices" (the default SWATCH is ALL,
so the default will behave the same).
This allows us to simplify the code a great deal as well.
Also trim off leading "***" if the server messages are handled by
handle_oper_vision(), as they already are in parse_server_notice().
Using strstr() here is entirely wrong. The intention is to catch notices
prefixed by *** or similar, and that's already detected further up in the code,
stored in the flag variable.
serversay() calls add_last_type(), so there's no need for the callers to do so
as well.
Remove the first argument to serversay() because it was always called with 1
anyway.
This was broken in commit [07cdd587], where 'sizeof' was used on a pointer
instead of the buffer pointed-to.
Fix this by having the caller of ircop_flags_to_str() supply a buffer and
length, since there's only two callers and both can use happily use stack
objects.
We don't know the server's proper name until registration, so the test against
that isn't reliable. We shouldn't be able to receive messages from anyone else
until we're registered, so this should be safe.
This requires changing serversay() to accept the from name instead of the
from_server. While we're there, replace the use of alloca() with simpler
logic based on m_sprintf().
This hook and format are used for NOTICEs where the destination isn't
a channel and isn't yourself - eg. global targets like $$*.org. This was
already the case for PRIVMSGs (using the MSG_GROUP hook and format).
Previously these were being routed like a normal NOTICE, and those don't
display the target, so it looked exactly like a private NOTICE to you.
This will also catch server notices sent before you're registered.
Channel WALL notices now have to match "[%Wall%/%] *", and have to be for
a channel that the client is actually on. Otherwise, they just appear as
ordinary NOTICEs.
We pass through ANSI just fine in PRIVMSGs, so we might as well treat
NOTICEs the same way too. The old code wasn't just stripping them out,
either - it was turning them into printable garbage.
variable name across functions. Use strlcat rather than strmcat.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/bitchx/code/trunk@409 13b04d17-f746-0410-82c6-800466cd88b0
BIG_BUFFER_SIZE. Even with many flags enabled the output string shouldn't
be larger than 512 bytes. Use strlcat rather than strmcat.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/bitchx/code/trunk@407 13b04d17-f746-0410-82c6-800466cd88b0
that isn't in a channel with the client (god knows how *that* happens, but
someone reported the bug...) could crash the client, because a NULL pointer
is passed to logmsg(). The bug didn't show under glibc because it handles
the NULL pointer OK.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/bitchx/code/trunk@58 13b04d17-f746-0410-82c6-800466cd88b0
